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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS SUBJECT TO THE ARCHIVES AND 
RECORDS SERVICES and INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT because it is 
an agency of the Utah Supreme Court and a state agency as 
defined in the statute. That act applies to the judiciary 
as well as the executive branch of government. The 
Governmental Immunity Act does not preculde this suit under 
that statute. 
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT & THE 
PUBLIC WRITINGS ACT TO THE UTAH STATE BAR DOES NOT OFFEND 
THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS because these statutes 
are mere regulatory enactments and not a usurpation of the 
power of the judiciary. The Public Writings Act is tempered 
by the Information Practices Act. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KNOW HOW GOVERNMENT MONEY 
IS SPENT is further and protected by the Utah Information 
Practices Act and the Public Writings Act. 
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS A STATE AGENCY since in 
everything it does it is supervised by this Court and since 
it perform important governmental functions. 
AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION REQUIRES FINDINGS OF FACT BY 
THE COURT and therefore a denial of statutory damages and 
statutory attorney fees must be supported by factual 
findings. Plaintiff's position is that the statute mandated 
an award of fees and statutory damages, but if there is 
discretion allowed in such awards, the discretion must be 
supported by facts. 
PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL, therefore, not only may questions of 
constitutionality be considered for the first time on 
appeal, but the impropriety of defense counsel may be 
considered by this Court on appeal when raised but not 
resolved by the trial court. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Cross-Appellant, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR and 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, 
Defendants 
Appellants, 
Cross-Respondents 
Case No. 88-0201 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
and RESPONDENT 
THE PLAINTIFF and CROSS-APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by 
and through the UTAH LEGAL CLINIC through submits the 
following REPLY BRIEF in support of his cross-appeal and in 
reply to the defendants' response Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS 
SUBJECT TO THE UTAH INFORMATION 
PRACTICES ACT 
Clear Language of Statute 
If the Utah Legislature had wanted the Archives and 
Records Services and Information Practice Act, Ut. Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) (hereinafter "the Act11) 
not to apply to the Utah Courts, the Legislature could have 
said so. The defendants' creative reading of the Act's 
provisions (Defendants1 Reply Brief, pp. 4 - 5) provides 
little assistance in interpretation of the Act. 
Defendants argue that Act does not apply to them. 
Defendants claim (Defendants1 Reply Brief, pp. 7 - 8) the 
Utah State Bar is not a "responsible authority11 as defined 
in the Act. "Responsible authority" is defined as any state 
office or state official established by law as a body 
responsible for the collection of any set of data on indi-
viduals. Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61(8) (1953 as amended). The 
Utah State Bar is responsible for collecting information 
about the plaintiff, all bar applicants and members and all 
of its employees. 
The Utah Supreme Court is obligated by law (Utah 
Constitution, Art. VIII, § 4) to supervise the admission of 
persons to practice law in Utah, which includes collecting 
information about applicants and members; that function has 
been delegated by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah State 
Bar. As a functionary of the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah 
State Bar is a "responsible authority" as defined in the 
Act. 
Defendants seem to argue (Defendants' Reply Brief, pp. 
7-8) that a "responsible authority" is not a "state 
agency." A "responsible authority" is any state office or 
official established by law as a body responsible for the 
collection of data. Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (8) (1953 as 
amended) "State agency" is defined as a department, board, 
bureau or other unit, however designated, of the state. Ut. 
Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (2) (1953 as amended) The construction 
of those two statutes is simple. When a "state agency" 
collects data it becomes and is a "responsible authority." 
The terms are used almost interchangeably throughout the 
applicable portion of the Act. Therefore, since the Utah 
Supreme Court is an entity of the state, its agent the UTAH 
STATE BAR is a state agency and a responsible authority. 
The two terms, state agency and responsible authority 
also relate to the defendants' suggestion (Defendants' Reply 
Brief, pp. 7 - 9) that plaintiff has sued the wrong parties 
and that suit, damages and attorney fees are authorized only 
against "the state" by Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88(1) (1953 as 
amended). That contortion makes nonsense of the provisions 
authorizing suit since by statutory definition a 
"responsible authority" is never the State but always a 
person or a state agency. The three sub-sections of Ut. 
Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1953 as amended) read together, make it 
clear that relief, suit, damages, and injunctions are 
available against the "responsible authority" and and the 
"state agency" and not just "the state." 
Archives and Records Service Act 
vs. 
Information Practices Act 
The state archivist's "record management program" is a 
noble goal as set out in Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-75 -- 63-2-79 
(1953 as amended), but that program has little to do with 
the obligations of responsible authorities and state 
agencies which hold public information related to "the 
public's business." Those duties are set out in the latter 
part of the Act and do not relate to the record management 
program. The "record management program" may be of interest 
only to the executive branch, but that does not prevent 
application of unrelated latter sections of the Act to the 
Utah State Bar. Much of the Act relates to the general 
functions of the state archives and the state archivist and 
the creation of a state-wide records management program; 
that fact lends no support for the defendants' claim (Defen-
dants' Reply Brief, pp. 4 - 5) that the provisions of the 
Act "relate only to the executive branch of state 
government." 
Defendants' argument (Reply Brief, pp. 4 - 5) comes 
from ignorance of the fact that prior to 1979, the statutes 
regarding state archives and records, the Archives and 
Records Service Act were found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 
et seq. (1953 as amended in 1969), and the Utah Information 
Practice Act was found at Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-50-1 et seq. 
(1953 as amended in 1975). The two statutes were combined 
by the legislature in 1979 into their present form. The two 
(2) different areas of legislative concern are related but 
the various provisions of the formerly two statutes can not 
be internally construed in a consistent manner. The Utah 
Information Practice Act as originally enacted in 1975 
provides no support for a claim that it applies only to the 
executive branch of government. 
Defendants' concern for the interpretation of the Act 
by the Department of Administrative Services (Defendants1 
Reply Brief, p. 4 - 5) is not helpful. The rules adopted by 
the Department of Administrative Services deal predominantly 
with the "records management program;11 those rules do not 
deal with, and cannot supercede, the statutory provisions 
which apply to the defendants and require the release of 
public information, found at the latter portion of the Act. 
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-85.4 et seq (1953 as amended). 
Defendants through creative mis-interpretation of Ut. 
Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) attempt to 
confuse the issues. None the less, the determination must 
be made that the Utah State Bar is a state agency which 
collects information on behalf of the Utah State Supreme 
Court and performs functions for that Court and is therefore 
s 
subject to the reasonable statutory requirements of the Utah 
Information Practices Act and the Public Writings Act. 
Governmental Immunity? 
Defendants' Governmental Immunity Act argument (Defen-
dants' Reply Brief, p. 3) raised for the first time on 
appeal is a non-issue. The Utah Information Practices Act 
created a new and separate cause of action exclusive of the 
Governmental Immunity Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 et seq 
(1953 as amended). The 1975 enactment of the Utah Informa-
tion Practices Act (Chapter 194, S.B. No. 232 passed March 
11, 1975) included a waiver of governmental immunity for in-
vasions of privacy through an amendment of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, Ut. Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1953 as amended). 
In addition, the plaintiff herein seeks declaratory and 
injunctive relief, along with statutory damages and attorney 
fees; such claims do not require notice under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Finally, plaintiff's letters to 
defendants (November 6, 1987 and December 11, 1987 --
Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "D" to plaintiff's appellate brief) 
are sufficient notice and comply with the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11 (1953 as amended). 
c 
Public Writings Act Tempered by 
Information Practices Act 
Defendants acknowledge (Defendants1 Reply Brief, pp. 6 
- 7) that the Public Writings Act applies to "judicial 
records" (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-26-1(2) (1953 as amended)) and 
then imply that that act removes all powers of a Court to 
seal its records or to withhold information from the public. 
The implication is false. 
The Utah Information Practices Act defines classes of 
information and determines which types may be made public 
and which are to remain confidential. Thus, the Public 
Writings Act is tempered by the Information Practices Act --
that is acknowledged and anticipated in the Public Writings 
Act ("except as otherwise expressly provided by statute"); 
the Information Practices Act modifies the Public Writings 
Act (Ut. Code Ann. §78-26-2 (1953 as amended)). Absent a 
countervailing force, those judicial records determined to 
be private or confidential, are not to be available to the 
public. 
II. 
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT 
& THE PUBLIC WRITINGS ACT 
TO THE UTAH STATE BAR 
DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONCEPT 
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The defendants express concern that the legislature 
should not be allowed, through statutes, to control what 
information the UTAH STATE BAR is required to release since 
the Bar as "an arm" of the judiciary must not be controlled 
by the legislature. (Defendants' Reply Brief, pp. 5 - 7 ) . 
In reality, many aspects of the judicial system are affected 
by legislative enactments. Application of the Information 
Practices Act and the Public Writings Act to the Utah State 
Bar would not be a serious blow to our three branch form of 
government. The application of these Acts to an agency of 
the Utah Supreme Court does not offend the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
Cases Cited by Defendants 
To fuel the fear of the destruction of our tri-partite 
government by plaintiff's claims herein, defendants cite In 
Re Washington State Bar Assoc, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976) 
and Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 
1980). There are clear distinctions between those cases and 
the case at bar. In both cited cases the legislative branch 
was a party to the action against the state bar and was 
attempting to audit the bars1 finances and records in search 
of malfeasance. In the instant case, plaintiff a dues 
paying member of the Bar, simply seeks specific information 
about how the Bar spends its (his) money. This is not an 
instance of one branch of state government attempting to 
interfere with another. 
The provisions of the Utah Information Practices Act 
and the Public Writings Act which require disclosure of 
information, are not unconstitutional usurpations of judi-
cial power, but simply reasonable regulations protecting the 
plaintiff's constitutional right to know how government 
money is spent. 
At issue here is not the regulation of the practice of 
law, a power belonging to the judiciary -- at issue is a 
minor regulatory provision. The statutes at issue do not 
infringe on the power of the Utah Supreme Court. This is 
not an attempt by the Legislature to usurp powers of the 
Judiciary. With those provisions applied to the UTAH STATE 
BAR, the Utah Supreme Court still completely and solely 
governs the practice of law in Utah. Art. VIII, § 4, Ut. 
Const. 
III. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO KNOW HOW GOVERNMENT MONEY IS SPENT. 
The Utah Archives and Records Services and Information 
Practices Act, recites in a provision entitled LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT: 
(2) In enacting this act, the Legislature recog-
nizes two fundamental constitutional rights: (a) 
the right of privacy in relation to personal data 
gathered by state agencies, and (b) the public's 
right of access to information concerning the 
conduct of the publicfs business. [emphasis 
added] 
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-60 (2) (1953 as amended). 
The broad reference of the statute to "the public1s 
business11 lacks any restrictive language suggesting 
application only to the executive branch. The "public's 
business" is conducted in Utah courts as well as an agency 
working for the Utah courts and obligated to regulate a 
profession in Utah. 
The two statutes at issue in this case protect the 
constitutional right of the plaintiff (and of the public) to 
know how government conducts "the public's business." 
IV. 
THE UTAH STATE BAR 
IS A STATE AGENCY 
In their attempt to show that the UTAH STATE BAR is 
something other than "an arm" of the Utah Supreme Court, 
defendants errorenously state "the Bar can only make rec-
ommendations to the Supreme Court concerning the admission 
and discipline of attorneys." (Defendants' Reply Brief, p. 
2) The UTAH STATE BAR can and does impose certain private 
discipline upon attorney without consultation or approval by 
the Supreme Court. (Discipline & Sanctions, Rule VII (e) & 
(f), Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar). There 
is no appeal from such private discipline. The UTAH STATE 
BAR can prevent a person from taking the Utah bar exam by a 
determination that the applicant lacks appropriate moral 
character; there is no appeal from that determination. 
(RULE NINE, Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar for Admis-
sion to The Bar as approved by the Utah Supreme Court, 
effective January 1, 1988). Such great governmental powers 
belongs not to some voluntary fraternal organization but 
only to a state agency. 
Defendants1 analogy of a law firm contracting to serve 
as county attorney for a small Utah county is interesting, 
(Defendants1 Reply Brief, p. 3) but the conclusion the 
defendants draw is erroneous. With regard to all of the 
work that such a contracting firm does for the county, that 
law firm is a governmental agency and must comply with the 
Utah Information Practices Act and the Public and Private 
Writings Act. And, in deed, a member of the public could 
insist on knowing exactly how much that contracting law firm 
is being paid for its services to the county! The 
defendant1 analogy fails because everything the UTAH STATE 
BAR does is a governmental function. 
Defendants continue to falsely claim that the UTAH 
STATE BAR "performs a number of functions which have nothing 
to do with the admission or discipline of attorneys or any 
governmental function11 and, therefore, it is not a state 
agency. (Defendants1 Reply Brief, p. 4) That is directly 
contradicted by the affidavit of Steve Hutchinson filed 
herein which says that in everything it does, the UTAH STATE 
BAR is subservient to the Utah Supreme Court; therefore 
every function of the UTAH STATE BAR is a government 
function! (As an Appendix attached to this brief is a copy 
of the Supplemental Affidavit of the defendant Hutchinson.) 
Unless Stephen Hutchinson is a liar, all functions of the 
UTAH STATE BAR are governmental functions! Therefore, the 
UTAH STATE BAR is an agency of the Utah Supreme Court in all 
regards. Therefore, the UTAH STATE BAR is subject to public 
scrutiny under the Acts. 
V. 
AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 
REQUIRES FINDINGS OF FACT 
BY THE COURT 
Defendants claim that the denial of statutory damages 
and attorney fees herein was discretionary on the part of 
Judge Wilkinson. Defendants' Reply Brief, p. 8. An act of 
discretion must be supported by facts; this Court cannot 
review discretionary acts without supporting findings of 
fact. Defendants are correct when they say that findings of 
fact are not normally required when a summary judgment is 
granted, (Defendants' Reply Brief, p. 9), but findings are 
required in this case! 
Findings of fact serve two important purposes. First, 
findings of fact serve to inform the parties about the "mind 
of the court" and the analysis the court sued to resolve the 
dispute. Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 
(Ut. 1983). As this Court has stated in LeGrand Johnson 
Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966), 
ff[t]he right to resort to the courts for the adjudication of 
grievances and the settlement of disputes is a fundamental 
and important one. An indispensable requisite to fulfilling 
that responsibility is the determination of questions of 
fact upon which there is disagreement.11 420 P. 2d at 616. 
The second purpose of findings of fact is to provide a 
basis on which an appellate court can review the judgment. 
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Ut. 1983)("Proper 
findings are essential to enable this Court to perform its 
functions of assuring that the findings support the judgment 
and that the evidence supports the findings.") 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does 
not mandate findings of fact in every case resolved by 
summary judgment motions, but in a case such as this, 
findings are essential. Rule 52(a), upon a ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment, requires that the court enter 
"a brief written statement of the ground for its decision 
. . . when the motion is based on more than one ground." 
There was no such statement or supporting explanation by the 
trial court in this case. 
Defendants claim support for the trial court's denial 
of statutory damages based upon a determination that the 
defendants1 violation was "in good faith." (Defendants' 
Reply Brief, p. 8) Such a determination was made without 
factual findings. There is nothing in the record to suggest 
"good faith" on the part of the defendants. 
The Information Practices Act mandates an award of 
attorney fees for any violation and requires assessment of 
statutory damages for a willful violation. Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-88 (1953 as amended). There is a no statutory 
exception allowing denial of attorney fees upon a showing of 
flgood faith,11 nor does the statute allow discretion as to 
attorney fees. Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1953 as amended) 
Absent strong justification, the trial court was 
obligated to award statutory damages and attorney fees to 
the plaintiff. The absence of supporting facts, prevent 
this Court from properly reviewing the "discretionary" 
decision of the trial court. 
VI. 
PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW 
MAY BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
False allegations of unethical conduct must concern 
this Court, the constitutionally mandated and ultimate 
supervisor of the practice of law in Utah. The defendants, 
responding to plaintiff's complaint, accused plaintiff of 
improper and unethical conduct; in the court below, they 
presented no evidence to support that false charge. The 
trial court make no direct ruling on their claim, however, 
the falsity of the charge was established by the ruling of 
Judge Wilkinson in favor of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff presents for this Court's consideration, 
as a legal question, the improper conduct of the Utah Bar 
Counsel as attorney for the defendants. The requested 
consideration and review represents a pure question of law, 
which may be raised for the first time on appeal (similar to 
an issue of constitutionality being raised). In support of 
this position, the Court should consider the Appellants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Strike, 
September 26, 1988, filed herein, which sets forth the 
various exceptions to the rule that matters not raised in 
the trial court may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
False and unfounded allegations of unethical conduct 
must not be countenanced by this Court. Appropriate action 
should be taken by this Court in response to the Fifth 
Affirmative Defense of the defendants. (T.R. 49-50). 
CONCLUSION 
Ignoring the formal trappings of this law suit and 
setting aside the niceties of legal theory, one has to ask: 
WHAT IS SO OFFENSIVE ABOUT INFORMING A 
DUES-PAYING MEMBER OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
AS TO EXACTLY HOW HIS DUES ARE BEING 
SPENT? 
SHOULD NOT THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF A 
COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION LIKE 
THE UTAH STATE BAR BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC 
SCRUTINY? 
The ruling of the trial court should be affirmed; the 
trial court properly determined that the Utah Information 
Practices Act and the Utah Public Writings Act apply to the 
~V\vi V:\VZ BA.R. The denial of statutory damages and 
-'.n.i-iKj iees should be reversed. 
The appeal of the defendants should be denied and this 
matter remanded with instructions to grant statutory damages 
and attorney fees to the plaintiff, including fees incurred 
on appeal. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & 
Cross-Appellant 
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A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR and. 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON 
Civil No. C88-0578 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON, being first duly sworn deposes 
and states as follows: 
1 • I am currently the Executive Director of the Utah 
State Bar, a position I have held since July 1, 1985. I am one 
of the defendants in this action. I am an attorney licensed to 
practice law in Utah. 
2. As Executive Director I am the chief administrative 
officer of the Bar and am responsible to the Board of 
Commissioners for all of the day-to-day management of Bar 
operations. I am responsible for the implementation of policies 
and resolutions adopted by the Board of Commissioners. I have 
authority with respect to the hiring and firing of all Bar staff 
employees, except for staff in the office of Bar Counsel. I work 
with the budget and finance committee to prepare the annual 
budget for approval by the Board of Commissioners. I am 
responsible for coordinating the Bar's involvement with the 
creation of the Law and Justice Center. I act as back-up to the 
Bar President as the public spokesperson for the Bar. I 
negotiate and sign contracts and other instruments within the 
approved budgetary limits of the Bar or as authorized by the 
Board of Commissioners. I have responsibility for overseeing the 
activities of 55 sections and committees of the Bar, development 
and implementation of Bar education programs and meetings of the 
Bar membership, Bar publications, admissions, and the lawyer 
referral service. I also have a developing role in the area of 
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professional research and development activities. I am a 
participant in the annual formal meetings between the Board of 
Commissioners and the Utah Supreme Court where a full report of 
the Bar activities is given to the Court and where the Court 
gives its input and guidance relative to the Bar activities. I 
am also present at the less formal meetings held approximately 
every several months usually involving less than the full Board 
of Commissioners and the Utah Supreme Court or some of the 
justices of the Court, where matters pertaining to the Bar are 
discussed. In these meetings and in other activities I assist 
the President of the Bar and the Board of Commissioners in 
fulfilling their responsibilities of reporting the activities of 
the Bar to the Utah Supreme Court. I also fulfill other 
functions and have other duties as may be prescribed by the Board 
of Commissioners. 
3. On or about April 14, 1988, I executed an affidavit 
in this case. A true and accurate copy of that affidavit is 
attached to this affidavit. Some amplification of the statements 
made in that affidavit may serve to clarify those statements. I 
did not intend to suggest by my statements in the affidavit that 
the Utah Supreme Court does not have any direction or control 
over some of the activities of the Utah State Bar. The Rules for 
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar specifically 
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state that the Bar is "under the direction and control" of the 
Supreme Court. I understand that to mean that the Bar, in all 
its activities and functions, is under the Court's direction and 
control. What I intended to say in my previous affidavit was 
that the Supreme Court exercises less direct supervision and has 
less direct involvement with regard to some activities of the Bar 
than with regard to other activities of the Bar. As to all 
activities, however, the Court retains ultimate control. It is 
my understanding that the Utah Supreme Court could at any time 
exercise its authority and terminate any specific activity of the 
Bar or terminate tne existence of the Bar itself. I consider the 
Utah State Bar to be completely subservient to and accountable to 
the Utah Supreme Court. The Bar seeks the approval and the input 
of the Court as it designs and implements new programs. The 
Board of Commissioners meets regularly with the Utah Supreme 
Court to report to the Court and to receive the Court's guidance 
and instructions. The Bar provides regular written reports to 
the Court covering financial matters, disciplinary actions, and 
other matters. 
DATED this j _ day of September, 1988. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s /f day of 
S e p t e m b e r , 1988. 
Mi ri 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
*//s/9o 
NOTARY PUBLIC . (/ I / /" ~f~ 
Residing 'at; ^/laS^ [ jf/ { fttnl^ 
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Utah State Bar 
139 East South Temple, #2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BERNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR and 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C80-0578 
Homer Wilkinson, Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON, being first duly sworn do say: 
1. I am the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Bar"). 
2. The Bar is an unincorporated non-profit organization 
which was originally organized in 1931. 
3. In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court integrated the Bar. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court adopted the "Rules for 
Integration of the Utah State Bar" and the "Rules of 
Organization and Management of the Utah State Bar". In its 
Rules for Integration/ the supreme court recited that it was 
perpetuating, creating and continuing the Bar under its 
direction and control. The supreme court also recognized the r PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
capacity of the Bar to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts 
and hold and dispose of property. In this connection, the 
supreme court specifically recognized the right of the Bar, both 
before and after integration, to privately own funds and 
property. In this regard, the Bar owns the building where it 
maintains its offices. 
4. The Bar is not financially supported by any taxes or 
other public funds. Rather, the Bar is supported solely by dues 
and fees paid by its members and Bar applicants. The Bar pays 
property taxes on the real and personal property which it owns, 
unlike state agencies which are exempt from such taxes. Bar 
employees are not paid by the state, are not entitled to join 
any of the state's retirements programs and are not entitled to 
obtain insurance through the state. 
5. The Utah Supreme Court delegated and authorized the 
Bar to recommend to the Supreme Court rules for admission and 
rules for discipline of attorneys practicing in the Utah State 
Courts. The Bar did so and the rules have been approved and 
adopted by the supreme court. All decisions which the Bar and 
its authorized committees make concerning the admission, 
suspension or disbarment of members of the Bar are advisory only 
to the supreme court, which retains the inherent power to admit, 
discipline or disbar members of the Bar. 
6. The Bar is engaged in numerous other activities not 
connected with th,e admission or discipline of Bar members which 
are not in any way governed, regulated or supervised by the 
supreme court. These activities include the semi-annual Bar 
courses and seminars, a Newsletter 
in Salt Lake City. 
April, 1988. 
STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
April, 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
dd8982a 
meetings, various educational 
and the Law and Justice Center 
DATED this y i \ day of 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herebv certify that on the 3rd day of JANUARY, 1989, 
I caused to be mailed two (2) copies of the above and 
foregoing pleading REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT and 
RESPONDENT to each of the following: 
CARMAN E. KIPP, Esq. 
ROBERT H. REES, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Cross-Respondents 
175 East 400 South # 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Cross-Respondents 
139 East South Temple # 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and 
JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Cross-Respondents 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing parties, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Cross-Appellant & 
Respondent 
